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a b s t r a c t
There exists a never-ending “arms race” between malware analysts and adversarial malicious code developers as malevolent programs evolve and countermeasures are developed to detect and eradicate them.
Malware has become more complex in its intent and capabilities over time, which has prompted the need
for constant improvement in detection and defence methods. Of particular concern are the anti-analysis
obfuscation techniques, such as packing and encryption, that are employed by malware developers to
evade detection and thwart the analysis process. In such cases, malware is generally impervious to basic
analysis methods and so analysts must use more invasive techniques to extract signatures for classiﬁcation, which are inevitably not scalable due to their complexity. In this article, we present a hybrid framework for malware classiﬁcation designed to overcome the challenges incurred by current approaches. The
framework incorporates novel static and dynamic malware analysis methods, where static malware executables and dynamic process memory dumps are converted to images mapped through space-ﬁlling
curves, from which visual features are extracted for classiﬁcation. The framework is less invasive than
traditional analysis methods in that there is no reverse engineering required, nor does it suffer from the
obfuscation limitations of static analysis. On a dataset of 13,599 obfuscated and non-obfuscated malware
samples from 23 families, the framework outperformed both static and dynamic standalone methods
with precision, recall and accuracy scores of 97.6%, 97.6% and 97.6% respectively.
© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

1. Introduction
Incidents of malware attacks are continually rising, with antivirus (AV) vendors, such as Kaspersky, reporting an average of
360,0 0 0 malware samples received daily (Kaspersky, 2020). Malware’s relentless growth can be attributed to the ﬁnancial rewards
that can be gained from malware exploits such as crypto-currency
coin miners, banker Trojans and ransomware. According to AVTest (2020), approximately 87% of malware processed in 2020 were
not original programs, but rather variants of existing families. This
presents a major problem to AV companies in terms of the processing overheads required to analyse every sample. Automated
tools can help alleviate the burden, but generally are conﬁgured for
detection rather than classiﬁcation. Analysis is further hampered
by malware obfuscation. Obfuscation has legitimate uses in computing to secure applications from copying or to protect intellectual property, but is also widely adopted by malware developers
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to evade detection from AV scanners and slow down the analysis
process. For the most part, static analysis is not robust against obfuscation, due to the upheaval of the binary structure of the malware program caused by these obfuscation methods. Dynamic approaches overcome the obfuscation limitations of static analysis,
since the programs must be de-obfuscated and written to main
memory prior to execution. However, dynamic analysis can produce a considerable number of false positives, due to similarities in
behaviour to benign programs or other families of malware. Hybrid
methods, where elements of both static and dynamic approaches
are combined, have been presented to overcome these limitations
(Anderson et al., 2012).
In this article, we present a novel malware classiﬁcation hybrid framework based on computer vision techniques. Computer
vision has been previously demonstrated as a viable alternative
to the more typical methods for malware classiﬁcation, such as
static frequency and sequence-based approaches (Khalilian et al.,
2018; Kolter and Maloof, 2004) or dynamic API call analysis
(Fukushima et al., 2010). Image-based approaches to malware
classiﬁcation involve the conversion of malware binaries to 2dimensional images, such that characteristic properties or features
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of the original ﬁle are retained (Vasan et al., 2020; Wagner et al.,
2015; Yajamanam. et al., 2018). Computer vision techniques are
then used to extract discriminant features from the images for
classiﬁcation. Malware classiﬁcation through computer vision can
be considered less invasive than the analysis approaches mentioned previously, as no reverse-engineering or domain-speciﬁc
knowledge is required, so it is less complex and thus can improve
scalability for the processing of large malware datasets.
Our framework combines static and dynamic features gathered from malware samples converted to 2-dimensional images,
mapped through space-ﬁlling curve (SFC) traversals. In mathematical analysis, SFCs are curves whose ranges contain the entire 2-dimensional unit square or more generally, an n-dimensional
unit hypercube. However, for the purposes of this research, only
the 2-dimensional space is considered, since the outputs are 2dimensional images. In this case, the 2-dimensional unit square
represents an image of n × n pixels. SFCs pass through every pixel
point of a regular spatial region, such that the spatial locality of
the data is preserved, i.e., closely located points in the binary ﬁle
space will also be closely located when mapped to an SFC image.
This is of signiﬁcant importance, as the data structures within the
original malware binaries can be retained in the resulting SFC images and thus used to represent the malware for classiﬁcation purposes. Our hybrid method processes non-obfuscated samples statically and obfuscated samples dynamically. Non-obfuscated samples
do not require behavioural dynamic analysis because suﬃcient features can be captured from the static binary. Dynamic analysis can
be considered more invasive since malware samples must be executed in a controlled environment to capture their behavioural
data and then written to physical memory on the host. Additionally, the time complexity for a fully dynamic analysis approach
would make it infeasible for large scale datasets. Adopting this hybrid approach enabled us to optimise the analysis process. Our hybrid framework is discussed in detail in Section 4. The main contributions of this research are:

types by their visual features, trained on a dataset of 14k samples
comprising 14 ﬁle types, including random data, encryption, compression, machine code, text and bitmap images. The best results
reported were from un-encoded and base64 encoded ﬁles, with
100% accuracy, with plain text ﬁles scoring 98.7%. While the initial
work presented by Conti et al. was not in the malware domain, it
demonstrated that the internal static structure of binary ﬁles could
be represented as 2-dimensional images, which paved the way for
further research efforts and tools that utilised byteplots for malware classiﬁcation.
2.2. Byteplot malware visualisation
Nataraj et al. (2011a) ﬁrst applied byteplots to represent malware binaries for classiﬁcation. Their method visualized static malware samples as gray-scale images, with the observation that for
many malware families, the images belonging to the same family appear very similar in layout and textures. Malware feature
vectors were derived using GIST, a global feature descriptor ﬁrst
presented by Oliva and Torralba (2001), that breaks images into
sub-band blocks and computes features based on ﬁlters tuned to
varying scales and orientations. The authors compiled a dataset,
dubbed Malimg, comprising 9548 samples from 25 malware families. Using a K-nearest neighbours (KNN) classiﬁer, Nataraj et al.
reported a classiﬁcation accuracy of 98%. Nataraj et al. (2011b) followed on from their original research, presenting a comparison of
the byteplot method with dynamic analysis. They used a combination of API hooking and pre-infection and post-infection system
snapshots to build dynamic feature vectors. Results showed that
overall, image classiﬁcation was comparable in terms of classiﬁcation accuracy with dynamic analysis methods but outperformed
the latter in terms of reduced time complexity and robustness
against obfuscated malware samples. While Nataraj et al. report
the byteplot method as resilient to obfuscation, their solution to
identifying packed malware was to treat it as a separate class. This
approach does not solve the packed malware problem as it is identifying the packed and unpacked samples from the same families
as two different species. Furthermore, the authors do not consider
the effect of encrypted malware samples on their GIST-based classiﬁcation method.
A number of subsequent research efforts applied the byteplot
format to malware classiﬁcation. Luo and Lo (2017) extracted visual features for classiﬁcation using Tensorﬂow and Local Binary
Patterns (LBP) feature descriptors on the Malimg dataset. Results showed that LBP and Tenserﬂow convolutional neural network produced a classiﬁcation accuracy of 93.17% as opposed
to 82.83% using the method proposed by Nataraj et al. (2011a).
Yajamanam et al. (2018) evaluated the GIST-based byteplot
method using a subset of features of the original method. Further testing was carried out using deep learning with Tensorﬂow. Results were comparable with the original research of
Nataraj et al. (2011a), while using a smaller feature set of 60
features. Le et al. (2018) used convolutional neural networks on
binary ﬁles from the Microsoft Malware Classiﬁcation Challenge
dataset (Ronen et al., 2018) converted to byteplot images. Results
on the data reported 98.8% accuracy on validation data with a fast
processing time-frame of approximately 20ms per sample.
Fu et al. (2018) extracted features from both gray-scale and
colour byteplots using local gray-level co-occurrence matrices and
global colour moments, which were then passed to Random Forest,
K-Nearest Neighbour and Support Vector Machine classiﬁers. The
experiments were carried out on a dataset comprised of 7087 malware samples from 15 distinct malware families showed the combined feature sets performed better than either local or global features alone, scoring 97% precision, recall, accuracy and f-measure
with the Random Forest classiﬁer.

• Novel image-based malware classiﬁcation framework that combines the strengths of static and dynamic analyses to overcome
the challenges of obfuscated programs;
• A novel representation of malware behavioural data derived
from process memory dumps mapped to SFC image format;
• A study of several feature descriptor and classiﬁcation approaches for image-based malware classiﬁcation;
• Three open source malware image datasets in SFC format, made
available for further research (ÓShaughnessy, 2019).
2. Related work
In this section, we review related visualisation-based techniques applied to malware analysis. Our focus is on binary-based
approaches where malware binary programs are converted into
image format and from there, discriminant features are extracted
for classiﬁcation. Such approaches do not require any preliminary
pre-processing of the malware binaries to extract characteristic
features.
2.1. Visualisation of binary ﬁles
The ﬁrst study on the visualisation of binary ﬁles as images
was introduced in the work of Conti et al. (2008), which presented
a method of reverse engineering binary ﬁles into visual images,
dubbed byteplots, to enhance the capabilities of text-based hex editors. Conti et al. used the byteplot method to create a visual taxonomy of binary ﬁle fragments to aid in the identiﬁcation of common
ﬁle formats. In (Conti et al., 2010), the authors extended their previous work using a K-nearest neighbours classiﬁer to classify ﬁle
2
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2.3. Space-ﬁlling curve malware visualisation
In contrast to the byteplot-related works discussed here, limited research has been presented on malware classiﬁcation using
space-ﬁlling curves. Baptista (2018) presented a method of classifying malware by type using Hilbert curves and a Self-Organizing
Incremental Neural Network. Experiments were conducted on 180
samples, 78 of which were benign. The malware was classiﬁed
into four classes: Trojan, ransomware, other and unknown. Although the author reported classiﬁcation accuracies of 89%, the
small sample set of 180 samples is insuﬃcient to provide a clear
indication of the merits of applying the Hilbert curve to malware classiﬁcation. Smaller datasets tend to produce overﬁtting,
which means the model will not generalise well to unseen samples. Vu et al. (2019) presented a malware detection scheme which
consisted of a hybrid of malware statistical and syntactic features translated to an image format using several layout functions,
including space-ﬁlling curves. The scheme, dubbed hybrid image
transformation (HIT) was tested on a dataset of 16,0 0 0 benign and
malicious samples. HIT was evaluated using four different layout
functions, including two SFC implementations, namely Hilbert and
Hcurve. The authors report the best results of 93% accuracy using
their hybrid method and Hilbert SFC layout function. The scheme
presented in this article considers only two classes, benign or malicious, so does not classify malware into family groups. In terms of
classiﬁcation, accuracy was the only performance metric used to
gauge classiﬁcation performance. Accuracy alone may not be sufﬁcient to measure performance; other metrics such as precision,
recall and F1-score could have been employed to give a better indication of the scheme’s success. Furthermore no testing was performed using a holdout dataset to evaluate how well the model’s
generalised to unseen data.

Fig. 1. Space-ﬁlling curve traversals. (a) Z-order, (b) Gray-code and (c) Hilbert.

samples. This research demonstrated the suitability of SFCs for
representing malware binaries in image format. However, as images were generated from static malware executable binaries, the
method did not perform optimally against obfuscated samples.
The framework presented in this article overcomes the limitations of the previous research discussed, in the following ways:
• A malware dataset which is representative of current malware
variants.
• A hybrid approach to feature selection and extraction, combining the strengths of static and dynamic analysis, with less overheads and limitations than previous methods discussed.
• Space-ﬁlling curves used to represent the malware for classiﬁcation. SFCs have previously demonstrated better classiﬁcation
performance compared to the predominant byteplot method.
3. Space-ﬁlling curves
Space ﬁlling curves are mathematical constructs, also known as
continuous fractal curves, the limits of which contain the entire
2-dimensional unit square. Peano (1890) introduced the ﬁrst SFC,
followed by an improved variant by Hilbert (1891). Other variations include Moore (Moore, 1900), Z-order (Morton, 1966) and
Gray-code (Gray, 1953) curves. The Hilbert, Z-order and Gray-code
curves were considered for the purposes of this article. The basic
traversal paths of these curves are shown in Fig. 1.

2.4. Summary
A review of the related research discussed in this section identiﬁes several limitations. First, previous work focused predominantly on the byteplot image format to represent the malware
data. This format is essentially a static view of the malware binary, which is not robust against obfuscation techniques such
as encryption or packing. Next, the Malimg dataset collected by
Nataraj et al. (2011a), was the test dataset chosen by the majority
of researchers to represent malware in image format. This dataset
was compiled in 2011 and so could not be considered representative of the current malware threat landscape. Other research efforts utilized the Microsoft Challenge dataset. The ﬁle headers have
been removed from the malware samples in this dataset for sterility. The incomplete nature of the malware samples in this dataset
means that it is not possible to extract a full feature set for classiﬁcation.
The work presented in this article follows on from previous research in (O’Shaughnessy, 2019), where the eﬃcacy of space-ﬁlling
curves was evaluated as a means of representing malware variants for classiﬁcation. Three SFC image datasets were produced by
mapping 9235 32-bit executable malware samples from 28 distinct families to images using Z-order, Hilbert and Gray-code curve
traversals. Local Binary Patterns (LBP), Histogram of Oriented Gradients (HOG) and Gabor ﬁlters were chosen as feature extraction
descriptors, based on their suitability for texture analysis. The features were used to train Random Forest, K-Nearest Neighbour and
Support Vector Machine classiﬁers. The best results were obtained
from the KNN-HOG model trained on the Z-order dataset, with
precision, recall and accuracy metric scores of 94.5%, 87.1% and
91.6% respectively. A comparative assessment with the method presented by Nataraj et al., showed the KNN-HOG Z-order SFC model
outperformed the GIST byteplot method against previously unseen

3.1. Suitability of space-ﬁlling curves for binary data representation
The locality preservation properties of SFC’s mean they can
be utilised in many areas of computing, such as partitioning or
reordering data and computations (Moon et al., 2001). Practical
applications of SFC implementations can be found in technologies such as database indexing (Huang, 2013), parallel computing
Nivarti et al. and image retrieval (Nguyen et al., 2012). Google’s S2
Geometry library uses the Hilbert curve for Geo-spatial indexing
in the Google Maps application (S2-Geometry, 2017). In the context of this research, the aim is to capture all relevant characteristic
features of malware binaries in an image format so that discriminant features may be extracted for classiﬁcation purposes. At the
core of these techniques is a layout function that inputs a set of
values and outputs a partition of space on the resulting mapped
image, such that regions represent disjoint data that do not intersect. Previously, tree-maps, have been presented as a solution
to the graphical display of data (Johnson and Shneiderman, 1991).
However, for high dimensional, dense layout tree maps, aspect
(width-to-height) ratios tend to be extremely high and thus elements in the mapped image are diﬃcult to correlate and interpret.
Wattenberg (2005) deﬁned the notion of a “perfect” layout function, i.e., a layout method for a space-ﬁlling visualization that satisﬁes the following four desirable criteria:
• Stability: a small change in inputs should produce a subsequent
small change in outputs;
3
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Fig. 2. Mapping data through SFC curve. Points a and b represent data points mapped to the resulting 2-dimensional SFC image.

• Split neutrality: any structural changes do not affect the structure of other regions on the image map;
• Order adjacency: each similar item should be located adjacent
to each other;
• Locality: layout regions should be relatively compact. If layout
regions are represented loosely, e.g. long and narrow, then the
visualisation of regions will not be as clear.
Wattenberg derived a proof that any perfect layout function is
actually an instance of a jigsaw map, so-called due to its resemblance of a jigsaw puzzle, thus providing a complete characterization of perfect layouts in terms of screen-ﬁlling curves. In particular, SFCs possess these four essential properties, therefore are a
practical solution to representing data in a 2-dimensional format.
3.2. Mapping binary ﬁles using space-ﬁlling curves

Fig. 3. SFC image mapped from a sample of the Chir worm. a denotes a mixture of
data types; b is a region of high value bytes (127–255 range); c is a region of ASCII
printable characters; d is a region of null bytes (binary zeros).

A SFC traces a continuous curve through every unit square, i.e.
pixel, in the image. To envision this for the purpose of ﬁle mapping, the binary code of a malware ﬁle can be thought of as a
ﬂattened out 1-dimensional line because the code is parsed sequentially, byte-by-byte. The SFC maps each point (bytes) from the
1-dimensional space to the 2-dimensional space (SFC image map)
such that closely located points in the binary ﬁle space will tend
to also be closely located when mapped to the SFC.
Fig. 2 depicts the mapping of a 1-dimensional set of points to a
2-dimensional curve representation, in this case the Hilbert curve,
in ﬁrst and second order iterations. It shows that closely located
data points (a and b in the example) map to similar positions on
the SFC map. For the purposes of this research, we used scurve,
a library written in Python, to convert the malware binaries into
SFC image format (Cortesi, 2012).
The scurve library uses a colour-coding scheme, based on data
type, that maps the malware binary data to the resulting SFC images. The colour scheme classiﬁes bytes (0–255 range) into the following categories: black for 0 × 00 (0), blue for ASCII text (1–126),
red for high-value bytes (127–254), and white for 0×ff (255).
Fig. 3 shows an example of an SFC image in Z-order generated
from the Chir family, which is a type of email worm ﬁle infector. The image was generated using the static PE executable ﬁle
and processed with the scurve library. If the data type from the
malware binary is distinct, it is displayed as non-overlapping sections of a single colour. Fig. 3(d) displays a large region of black,

indicating large sections of the ﬁle contain zeros or null padding,
which is sometimes used as a simple obfuscation method by malware developers. There is also a large region of printable characters, shown in blue Fig. 3(c), with some small sections of highvalue bytes, denoted by the red regions Fig. 3(b). The rest of the ﬁle
comprises a mixture of multiple data types, which give the resulting image distinct texture regions Fig. 3(a). Distinct features that
are common to related species of malware can be extracted from
the textures produced in the SFC images for classiﬁcation.

4. Hybrid framework
This article introduces a novel framework for the classiﬁcation
of malware variants into their respective family classes through
computer vision and machine learning. The framework comprises
static and dynamic analysis components, i.e. features extracted
from malware binaries in both static or non-running and dynamic
or running states. A process workﬂow of the framework is shown
in Fig. 4. This section describes the framework, which comprises
three main stages: malware conversion, feature extraction and
classiﬁcation. Malware sample data gathering and pre-processing
are ﬁrst discussed.
4
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Fig. 4. Process workﬂow of the proposed SFC hybrid framework.

4.1. Data gathering and pre-processing

Table 1
Malware dataset comprising samples collected from the VirusTotal
academic share repositories.

A dataset comprising 13,599 32-bit executable portable executable (PE) samples, from 23 distinct malware families was compiled from the VirusTotal Academic share repository. Three image
datasets were derived from the samples through the Hilbert, Graycode and Z-order curve traversals using the scurve library. Table 1
shows the structure of the dataset, including the family and count
for each class. Out of the 23 family classes, 5 were considered
obfuscated. The dataset contains a more up-to-date set of samples than the Malimg and Kaggle datasets, with some of the most
prevalent and current malware species in circulation today. To test
the predictive capabilities of the classiﬁcation models on unseen
malware, an evaluation set of 1350 samples or approximately 10%
of the data was held out from the original dataset. Samples were
chosen using stratiﬁed random sampling, which gives a subset
structure that is representative of the entire dataset. Following the
removal of the data for the evaluation set, the training dataset consisted of 12,249 samples. It should be noted that benign ﬁles were
not included in the dataset, as the aim of this research was to classify variants into their correct family classes, rather than detect between malicious and benign samples.
Prior to conversion of the malware binaries to SFC image format, the Shannon entropy for each sample was ﬁrst calculated
to determine the level of obfuscation, if any. Shannon entropy

5

Family

Obfuscation

Count

InstallMonster
Agen
Autoit
Allaple
Bitman
Vilsel
Berbew
Emotet
Hematite
Dinwod
Trojan.Agent.BDMJ
Picsys
Shifu
Viking
Locky
Cryptowall
Scar
Dridex
Salgorea
Socks
Sytro
Dorkbot
Chir
Total

No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes

575
676
966
339
1090
752
1692
492
562
893
97
534
476
264
648
282
304
523
607
495
1140
92
306
13,599
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• The process information and kernel context (ETHREAD) for the
thread that stopped
• The Kernel-mode call stack for the thread that stopped

(Shannon, 1948) measures the degree of randomness for a given
set of data, ranging from 0 for orderly or non-random data, to
8 for very random data. For binary ﬁles, Shannon entropy can
be used as an indicator for malware obfuscation since techniques
such as encryption or packing distort binary data and therefore
produce a high entropy score. Previous work by Lyda and Hamrock (2007) demonstrated that obfuscation techniques such as encryption and packing increase the entropy value of the original binary ﬁle. Using a dataset of 21,576 portable executable malware
ﬁles, the authors produced a table of entropy ranges to identify the
obfuscation type. The average entropy for packed malware binaries
was found to be 6.8, whereas the average entropy for encrypted binaries was 7.1. The average entropy for a native executable ﬁle was
found to be 5.1. For the purposes of this research, we considered
the value μ as the Shannon entropy threshold of 6.8, to determine
if samples were obfuscated.

To illustrate the suitability of process dumps for representing
malware behavioural features, we focus here on examining the call
stack traces taken from two variants of the Chir family. The call
stack is made up of the chain of function calls that have led to
the current location of the program counter, where the process
has been terminated by the Procdump tool. Intuitively, malware binaries that share similar source code will behave the same when
executed on the target machine, which results in similar execution traces in the same sequence. These similarities can be used
as signatures to group malware variants into their respective family classes. It is infeasible to show a complete stack trace of each
program, so we conﬁne our comparison to the process injection
routine of the Chir samples, shown in Fig. 5.
Chir malware implements a process injection routine to obfuscate its presence on the operating system. During this routine, the malware injects a copy of itself, via svchost.exe, into
WerFault.exe, which is a legitimate Windows program for error fault reporting. This speciﬁc routine is characteristic of the Chir
variant, so could be considered as part of the signature for identiﬁcation. From Fig. 5, the function calls and call sequences are identical, which indicates the two samples share the same behavioural
traits for this code injection routine. The behavioural data captured
from the running process dumps allowed us to overcome the obfuscation limitations and improve classiﬁcation performance over
the static standalone method, as discussed in Section 5.

4.2. Virtual machine introspection
As stated previously, we optimised the framework by only extracting dynamic or behavioural data from the samples considered to be obfuscated, above the threshold μ. Dynamic analysis
can be considered more invasive than static methods since the
samples must be executed in a controlled environment to capture their behavioural data, which is then written to the physical host. Consequently, the time complexity to execute every sample in this manner would make it infeasible for large datasets.
Furthermore, to implement this method on non-obfuscated malware samples would not yield any greater results, as demonstrated by O’Shaughnessy (2019), where classiﬁcation performance
for low entropy malware executables in SFC format was found to
be high. For dynamic analysis, we implemented Virtual Machine
Introspection (VMI), a process introduced by Garﬁnkel and Rosenblum (2003) that refers to the inspection or monitoring of operating systems residing inside a virtual machine from the hypervisor level. In this case, malware is passed to a virtual machine,
is executed and a process memory dump is extracted using the
Microsoft utility Procdump (Russinovich and Richards, 2020). The
dump ﬁle is then written back to disk on the host machine. To
optimise the analysis process, mini process dumps containing process thread and handle information, were extracted from each malware in execution. While full process dumps contain the full malware process data, it was found they ranged on average from 50
to 70 MB for each dump, which would not scale well for large
datasets and so were not considered for the purposes of this research.

4.3. Malware conversion
Once the malware samples have been processed, the next stage
in the framework is to convert the non-obfuscated malware executable samples and the obfuscated sample process dumps to SFC
format through the scurve library. This section discusses the implementation of the mapping procedures using the scurve library
outlined in Section3. The Hilbert implementation differs from the
Z-order and Gray-code methods, which are inherently similar. The
Hilbert implementation ﬁrst determines the dimensions of input
binary. It then iterates through each coordinate point, which is
mapped to its data colour class. The implementation of the Z-order
and Gray code curves are similar, in that the scurve library considers the bit range for each distinct chunk of binary data as coordinates. In other words, the start offset is the ﬁrst coordinate and
the end offset is the second coordinate. In the case of the Z-order
code, the bit interleaving process then takes place. For the Gray
code, the coordinates are XORed from left to right. The resulting
codes in each case, represent the cell that the binary chunk will
occupy, which is mapped to a distinct colour, depending on the
data colour class.
Fig. 6(a − c ) illustrates an individual sample taken from the Allaple malware family, transformed into SFC images through the
Hilbert, Gray-code and Z-order traversals. The areas of blue (ASCII
printable characters) and the smaller areas of red (high value nonprintable bytes) are evidently similar across the three SFC images.
However, the positions of the texture patterns differ, due to the
different traversal patterns of the space-ﬁlling curves.
Examples of SFC images converted from the process dump ﬁles
are shown in Fig. 7. Each image represents a variant of the Cryptowall ransomware family. The Cryptowall variant uses encrypted
sections as a means of obfuscation and so static analysis methods produce poor results. This necessitated their execution through
VMI to gather behavioural data for classiﬁcation. It can be seen
from the images that the data texture regions are sparse, with
large regions of black, which equate to binary zeros. An examina-

4.2.1. Process dump ﬁle analysis
In this section we analyse the contents of sample process dump
ﬁles in order to demonstrate the advantage of using dynamic data
over static analysis for obfuscated malware. Static methods are
limited to the analysis of structure and code of the malware binary.
However, obfuscation methods such as packing, encryption and encoding alter the binary structure of the code to the extent that
common salient features cannot be obtained for the purposes of
classiﬁcation. By executing malware in a controlled virtual environment, the binary must be de-obfuscated and written to memory.
Thus, we can extract behavioural features characteristic of samefamily classes. As stated previously, we use the small or mini dump
format for processing eﬃciency. Mini dumps contain the following
data:
•
•
•
•

The Stop message and its parameters and other data
A list of loaded drivers
The processor context (PRCB) for the processor that stopped
The process information and kernel context (EPROCESS) for the
process that stopped
6
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Fig. 5. Process injection call stack traces from two Chir family variants.

vides an overview of how each descriptor was applied in the context of this work. In the case of each descriptor, a dataset of feature vectors was generated for every image, along with a dataset
of corresponding family class labels.
LBPs compute a local representation of texture by comparing
and thresholding each pixel with its surrounding neighbourhood
of pixels. The original LBP operator forms labels for the image pixels by thresholding the 3 × 3 neighbourhood of each pixel with the
centre value and considering the result as a binary number. The
histogram of these 28 = 256 different labels are used as a texture
descriptor, which can represent the grayscale range of 0 − 255. In
our framework, we used the circular pixel neighbourhood extension to the original LBP operator, proposed by Ojala et al. (20 0 0).
The extension operator allows a greater number of neighbourhood
points to be considered in the calculation, and thus can capture
textures at varying scales of granularity. The main parameters to
consider in the LBP descriptor are the radius of the circular neighborhood and the number of data points on the circle’s circumference. Values at non-integer pixel coordinates are bi-linearly interpolated which allows any radius and number of pixels in the
neighbourhood.
Fig. 8(a − d ) shows a schematic of the LBP feature extraction
process used in this research. The SFC image in Fig. 8(a) is ﬁrst
converted to grayscale Fig. 8(b). Next, the LBP operator is applied
Fig. 8(c), which returns a histogram of features that is constructed
from the LBP number values Fig. 8(d). Next, each histogram is
added to an array. As each histogram is calculated, it is concatenated to the array. The result is an array of feature histograms,
which represent the feature vector for the image.
Gabor ﬁlters The Gabor ﬁlter is a sinusoidal signal of a given frequency and orientation. Since a single ﬁlter is spatially localised,
banks of Gabor ﬁlters with varying orientations and frequencies
are applied to the image as the ﬁlter must pass in the same direction as the target texture to return accurate features. In our descriptor we used a Gabor bank of 0–180 at intervals of 45 to ensure

Fig. 6. SFC images of the same Allaple malware sample. (a) Hilbert, (b) Gray-code
and (c) Z-order curve implementations.

Fig. 7. SFC images converted from process dumps of Cryptowall ransomware samples.

tion of the memory dumps conﬁrmed that the majority of the ﬁles
comprised of binary zeros.
4.4. Feature extraction
Three feature descriptor algorithms were evaluated, namely
Local Binary Patterns (LBP) (Ojala et al., 1996), Gabor ﬁlters (Gabor, 1946) and Histogram of Oriented Gradients (HOG)
(McConnell, 1986). While the HOG descriptor is primarily used for
object detection in images, it has produced favourable results in
texture analysis (Demir, 2018; Harb et al., 2017). This section pro7
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Fig. 10. HOG feature extraction process.

were orientation, pixels-per-cell and cells-per-block. The orientation parameter represents the number of orientation bins in the
resulting histograms. Pixels-per-cell determine the size, in pixels,
of each cell. Similarly, cells-per-block determine the size of each
block.
It should be noted here that the optimum parameters for each
descriptor were determined through an extensive tuning process,
outlined in Section 4.6
4.5. Classiﬁcation of SFC hybrid features
Fig. 8. LBP feature extraction process.

The next stage in the framework is the classiﬁcation stage. The
aim of classiﬁcation in this context is to order the malware samples into their taxonomic groups or family classes, based on the
textural similarities extracted from the SFC images by the LBP,
Gabor and HOG descriptors. Supervised learning algorithms were
used exclusively in this research since the class labels, i.e., the
malware family names, were already known. The trained classiﬁcation models were then tested on the 10% holdout validation
set, described in previously in Section 4.1, to gauge how well they
generalised to previously unseen data. The following classiﬁcation
algorithms were evaluated: Random Forest (RF), Support Vector
Machine (SVM) and K-nearest Neighbours (KNN). These classiﬁers
were chosen as previous research by O’Shaughnessy (2019) demonstrated favourable performance results when applied to malware
SFC feature datasets. Efforts were made during the classiﬁcation
training phases to reduce the possibility of underﬁtting and overﬁtting in the resulting classiﬁcation models. Overﬁtting occurs
when the model ﬁts the data too well, mainly due to it capturing noise along with the underlying signatures or patterns in the
data. A model that is trained to ﬁt slightly inaccurate data can infect it with substantial errors and reduce its predictive power. To
reduce the risk of underﬁtting, a suitably large dataset was compiled. Stratiﬁed k-fold cross-validation was used to minimize overﬁtting. Through experiments, the optimal value for k was found to
be 5.

Fig. 9. Gabor ﬁlter feature extraction process.

we captured suﬃcient texture features from varying directions. The
main Gabor ﬁlter parameters considered in this work were:
• k: is the size in pixels of the Gabor kernel. The value of k is
preferably odd and the kernel is a square for the sake of uniformity.
• σ : is the standard deviation of the Gaussian function used in
the Gabor ﬁlter.
• θ : is the orientation of the normal to the parallel stripes of the
Gabor function.
• γ : represents the spatial aspect ratio
Fig. 9(a-c) depicts the Gabor ﬁlter process used in this research.
The example image is taken from the Emotet banker Trojan family
in Hilbert format. The SFC image in 9(a) is input and a series of
ﬁlters are applied in varying orientations and frequencies 9(b). The
resulting ﬁlters are then convoluted to produce the ﬁnal feature
vector for the image 9(c), which is appended to the feature array.
Histogram of oriented gradients The Histogram of Oriented Gradients (HOG) feature descriptor counts occurrences of gradient orientation in localized portions of an image. Local object appearance
and shape within an image can be characterized by the distribution of intensity gradients or edge directions. Fig. 10 shows the
HOG feature extraction process used in our framework. The source
SFC image is divided into blocks and each block is sub-divided
into cells. The vertical and horizontal gradients are computed for
each pixel in a cell. The orientation histogram is then created for
each cell. Bins represent the different angles of orientation. The ﬁnal feature descriptor consists of a concatenation of the cell histograms for each block, which is then ﬂattened into a feature vector. The parameters considered when tuning the HOG descriptor

4.6. Parameter tuning
In order to produce optimal classiﬁcation performance, a complex parameter tuning process was necessary, which involved collectively tuning the feature extraction algorithms with the classiﬁers. Determining an optimal set of parameters was therefore not
a trivial task; there is not a ”one-size-ﬁts-all” default set of parameters that will optimise performance of the feature descriptors
and classiﬁers combined. A search method was implemented to
determine the optimal combination of hyper-parameters, namely
GridSearchCV, which is part of the Python Sci-kit Learn library
(Sklearn, 2020). With GridSearchCV, all the possible combinations
of parameter values are evaluated, and the best combination is retained. Initially, default parameter ranges were chosen and then
tested. It was found in some cases, wider parameter ranges were
required to produce optimal results. For example, prior research in
SVM classiﬁers tended to use a small value for the penalty parameter C, between 0 and 1. However, it was found that the models
8
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Table 3
Sample sizes for each dump interval (15 secs to 60 secs).

Table 2
Evaluation of image size on processing time and classiﬁcation performance.
Dims.

Precision

Recall

Accuracy

Processing time (ms)

32
64
128
256
512

86.2
92.8
96.8
97.7
97.9

84.1
92.7
96.8
97.7
97.8

84.2
92.6
96.7
97.7
97.9

0.5
3.8
2.28
8.1
28.3

Time interval (secs.)

produced in this work performed better with higher values of 50010,0 0 0.

Family

15

30

45

60

Agen
Chir
Cryptowall
Emotet
Scar

676
306
282
492
304

630
201
197
365
156

520
132
99
229
102

433
76
67
164
83

results, but processing time was 3.5 times slower. Furthermore, the
conversion process from binary to 512 × 512 image, took approximately 5 seconds per sample, which would not be scalable to large
datasets.

4.7. Performance metrics
In order to gauge how robust the frameworks classiﬁcation
models were, we tested their performance using precision, recall
accuracy. Precision is the ratio of correctly predicted positive observations to the total predicted positive observations. In this case,
the ratio of correctly predicted samples for a family to the total
predicted as that family i.e., ’for all the malware labelled as a particular family, how many were correct?’. Recall is the ratio of correctly predicted positive observations to the all observations in actual class. In this case, it is the ratio of the correctly predicted
malware to the total number for that family, i.e., ’for each malware
family, how many that should have been labelled as that family, were
labelled correctly?’. Accuracy is the fraction of correct predictions
that the model predicted correctly.

5.2. Inﬂuence of dynamic runtime on classiﬁcation performance
The process dump ﬁles extracted through VMI represent the
behaviour of the malware in execution, i.e., its interaction with
the operating system. Therefore, the time interval in which the
samples are allowed to execute before the dump is triggered can
greatly inﬂuence the number of behavioural features returned and
consequently, can affect the overall classiﬁcation performance.
To this end, we determined the optimum running times for
each family by executing the obfuscated samples in the virtual machine at intervals ranging from 15 seconds to 60 seconds. Intervals
beyond 60 seconds could not be considered scalable to large sample sets and so were not investigated here. It was observed during
execution, that many malware samples terminated at different intervals. Closer examination of the dynamic execution revealed the
following:

5. Experimental analysis and results
This section presents the experiments devised to investigate the
eﬃcacy of the hybrid framework for the classiﬁcation of malware.
The inﬂuence of image size on classiﬁcation was ﬁrst asserted to
produce the optimal dataset for further analysis. The testing of
the hybrid framework is discussed next, followed by a comparative analysis with both static and dynamic standalone methods. In
the case of standalone static analysis, all samples were converted
directly to SFC image format prior to the feature extraction stage.
In standalone dynamic analysis, all samples were executed through
VMI and their process dumps were converted to SFC image format
prior to feature extraction.

• The Chir, Cryptowall and Scar families each performed code injection as part of their execution routine, which meant the original processes executed by the Procdump tool were terminated.
This resulted in the dump being triggered for the interval up
until that point and no further behavioural data could be captured.
• In the case of Emotet, it was found that the malware attempted
to connect with domains that were no longer in service and
the failed connection triggered a kill-switch. Similarly to the
previous samples, when the process terminated no further data
could be captured.

5.1. Evaluation of image dimension on classiﬁcation

This resulted in a reduced number of dump samples for each
incremented time interval. Table 3 shows the sample size for each
family at the varying dump intervals. For example, the original
dataset for the Scar variant contained 304 samples, which reduced
down to 83 at the 60 second interval.
Table 4 shows the classiﬁcation results for each of the families tested. For comparative purposes, the results from the static
method are also shown. It is evident from Table 4 that, as the sample sizes decrease, so too does classiﬁcation performance. Smaller
sample sizes generally mean there is a narrow range of features
for training the classiﬁcation models. This can negatively inﬂuence
the generalization capabilities of the models on previously unseen
data, which is the case here. The optimum time interval for Chir,
Cryptowall, Emotet and Scar was found to be 15 seconds, while
Agen performed best at the 30 second interval, shown in bold.
The shorter processing intervals mean our method could potentially scale well to larger datasets. Overall, the results demonstrate
that the dynamic method provides an improvement in classiﬁcation performance over the standalone static method.
While a full process trace could be implemented to include the
injected process information, it is beyond the scope of this study.
For the purposes of further analysis presented in this section, the

The aim of this evaluation was to investigate the inﬂuence of
varying sizes of SFC images on classiﬁcation performance and time
complexity. The objective was to choose an image size that was
feasible in terms of its conversion and processing times, while returning optimum classiﬁcation performance. The dimensions of an
image can inﬂuence the number of features produced, which can
in turn have an affect on classiﬁcation performance and processing speed. Our aim was to build a robust framework that was also
scalable, so time complexity was an additional consideration. The
evaluation was conducted on images ranging from 32 × 32 pixels
to 512 × 512 pixels. Processing times for image sizes above 512 became infeasible for both conversion and classiﬁcation and so are
not considered. Table 2 shows the inﬂuence of the varying image
dimensions on classiﬁcation performance. From the results, it is
evident that as image dimension size increases, performance improves, but at a cost of slower processing times. For the purposes
of our further analysis, we chose the 256 × 256 dataset, since it
yielded a high classiﬁcation performance, 97.7% across all three
metrics, within a reasonably fast processing time, at 8ms per sample. The 512 × 512 dataset yielded marginally better classiﬁcation
9
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Table 4
Inﬂuence of process dump time interval on classiﬁcation performance.
Static

15

30

45

60

Family

precision

recall

accuracy

precision

recall

accuracy

precision

recall

accuracy

precision

recall

accuracy

precision

recall

accuracy

Chir
Cryptowall
Emotet
Scar
Agen

79.2
81.6
86.9
86.6
82.5

56.1
57.1
86.7
76.4
79.1

65.6
67.2
85.9
81.2
80.8

94.4
90.1
93.8
93.4
99.5

92.7
91.0
94.3
89.5
92.6

93.6
90.5
94.1
91.4
95.9

92.5
85.5
79.1
92.3
99.1

88.6
75.7
68.0
68.6
97.7

90.5
80.3
73.1
78.7
98.4

81.8
87.5
76.2
88.9
98.0

80.0
46.7
71.1
53.3
95.2

80.9
60.9
73.6
66.7
96.6

80.9
72.7
79.1
87.5
97.6

76.0
64.0
75.6
35.0
97.1

78.4
68.1
77.3
50.0
97.4

Table 5
Hybrid framework classiﬁcation performance results (training phase).
Hilbert

Z-order

Graycode

Model

precision

recall

accuracy

precision

recall

accuracy

precision

recall

accuracy

KNN-LBP
RF-LBP
DT-LBP
KNN-Gabor
RF-Gabor
DT-Gabor
KNN-HOG
RF-HOG
DT-HOG

91.9
90.4
86.2
92.1
92.4
89.0
94.9
92.0
82.8

91.9
90.4
86.2
91.4
92.4
89.0
94.9
92.0
82.8

91.9
90.3
86.2
92.1
92.3
88.9
94.0
92.0
82.7

91.2
90.5
85.9
92.5
92.2
88.0
97.6
91.5
80.7

91.2
90.5
85.9
92.5
88.5
88.0
97.6
91.5
80.7

91.1
90.4
85.9
92.5
92.2
88.0
97.6
91.4
80.7

91.2
90.2
85.5
93.5
93.1
88.3
93.8
92.0
81.0

91.2
90.2
85.5
93.2
93.1
88.3
93.2
92.0
81.0

91.2
90.2
85.5
93.5
93.0
88.3
93.9
92.0
81.0

15 second interval dumps were chosen for Chir, Cryptowall, Emotet
and Scar and the 30 second interval dumps for Agen.

performed best on the unseen data, with precision, recall and accuracy scores of 97.1%, 96.6% and 97.0% respectively. The performance metrics indicate that the KNN-Model model trained on the
Z-order data generalises best to new data, as it can identify variants it has not seen previously with a high degree of classiﬁcation
performance.

5.3. Framework classiﬁcation training
Experimental analysis was carried out using the Hilbert, Graycode and Z-order image datasets. Each classiﬁcation model was
trained following the same procedure:

5.5. Comparison with static and dynamic standalone approaches

• Calculate the Shannon entropy for each executable:
• If μ ≥ 6.8, extract process dump using VMI
• Convert each sample/ process dump to SFC image format.
• Compute the feature vector and label for each image sample.
• Train the classiﬁer on the feature set (perform k-fold crossvalidation).
• Compute the average precision, recall and accuracy.

We performed a comparative analysis of the framework against
static and dynamic standalone methods to demonstrate the performance advantages of incorporating a hybrid approach. In the
case of the static approach, all samples were mapped from nonrunning executable binaries to SFC image format. For the dynamic
method, all samples were executed in a virtual machine and process dumps were collected, which in turn were converted to SFC
format. Classiﬁcation models were trained as before in the case
of the hybrid framework. Table 6 shows the results for each approach. For brevity, we only show the best performing models
for each of the static, dynamic and hybrid approaches. The KNNHOG-Graycode model proved to be the best classiﬁer on the training data for the static analysis method. The KNN-HOG-Z-order
model performed the best in both dynamic and hybrid methods.
Although each of the models performed well in the training phase
using cross-validation, the hybrid model outperformed both static
and dynamic models, with precision, recall and accuracy scores of
95.1% in each case.
The three models were tested on the 10% holdout evaluation
dataset. The KNN-HOG model performed best across all analysis
methods. The hybrid model again outperformed both the static
and dynamic models, with precision, recall and accuracy scores of
97.1%, 96.6% and 97.0% respectively. In terms of time complexity,
the static method provided the fastest processing time, with an average of 7.88ms per sample. The processing overheads are low for
the static method, since there is no need to execute the malware
in a virtual machine. As expected, the dynamic standalone method
was slowest, at an average of 33 seconds per sample, since each
malware sample was executed for 30s in the virtual machine to
capture suﬃcient behavioural data in the process dump. The hy-

For each of the Hilbert, Graycode and Z-order SFC image
datasets, features were extracted using LBP, Gabor and HOG feature descriptors and each feature set was then passed to the SVM,
RF and KNN classiﬁers. In total, 27 classiﬁcation models were produced, 9 for each SFC dataset. Table 5 shows the training classiﬁcation performance results for each model. The KNN-HOG model
yielded the best training results for all three SFC datasets, with
precision, recall and accuracy of 97.6% for each metric. The confusion matrix for the KNN-HOG Z-order model is shown in Fig. 11.
It is evident from the confusion matrix that the model yielded
favourable results overall on the training data, with true positive
rates of 90% or above for 22 out of the 23 classes, including 100%
true positive scores in 9 classes. The lowest true positive rate was
returned for Locky at 89%.
5.4. Hybrid classiﬁcation model evaluation
In order to build robust classiﬁcation models, it is crucial to
evaluate how well they generalise to new data. Poor models may
perform well in the training phase, but when presented with previously unseen data, performance can decrease considerably. As
stated previously, 10% of the original data was held for evaluation
purposes. As in the training phase, the KNN-HOG Z-order model
10
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Fig. 11. Confusion matrix for KNN-HOG trained on the Z-order SFC dataset.

Table 6
Classiﬁcation performance and time complexity comparison of the proposed hybrid method against static and dynamic standalone approaches (evaluation phase).
Training

Evaluation

Time

Method

Model

SFC

precision

recall

accuracy

precision

recall

accuracy

Average (ms)

Static
Dynamic
Hybrid

KNN-HOG
KNN-HOG
KNN-HOG

Gray-code
Z-order
Z-order

94.5
92.2
95.1

87.1
90.5
95.1

91.5
93.2
95.1

82.3
93.8
97.6

80.3
92.7
97.6

83.1
92.2
97.6

7.88
33 × 103
12.5 × 103

brid model averaged 12.5 seconds per sample. The time complexity of the hybrid model is affected by the number of obfuscated or
high entropy samples encountered in the dataset.

set. It is evident that the hybrid model proved to provide the best
resilience to the obfuscated samples, outperforming both static
and dynamic methods across all families. Although the dynamic
method performed comparatively well, the time complexity of the
process dump approach makes it infeasible at scale.

5.5.1. Resilience to obfuscation
In this section we demonstrate the superiority of the hybrid
method against obfuscation by focusing on the performance of
the static, dynamic and hybrid analysis on the obfuscated families within the evaluation set. The obfuscated set comprises 205
samples from the Agen (68), Emotet (49), Cryptowall (28), Scar
(30) and Chir (30) families. Table 7 shows the results for the three
methods against the obfuscated data. It should be noted that these
results were based on the performances from the full evaluation

5.6. Comparative analysis with benchmark method
It is important to test the eﬃcacy of our method against previous image-based malware classiﬁcation approaches. The approach
chosen for comparative analysis was the KNN-GIST method presented by Nataraj et al. (2011a), described previously in 2.2. This
method can be considered a benchmark as it was the ﬁrst to apply
11

S. O’Shaughnessy and S. Sheridan

Computers & Security 116 (2022) 102660

Table 7
Static, dynamic and hybrid models resilience to obfuscation.
Static

Hybrid

Dynamic

Family

precision

recall

accuracy

precision

recall

accuracy

precision

recall

accuracy

Chir
Cryptowall
Emotet
Scar
Agen

79.2
81.6
86.9
86.6
82.5

56.1
57.1
86.7
76.4
79.1

65.6
67.2
85.9
81.2
80.8

94.4
90.1
93.8
93.4
99.1

92.7
91.0
94.3
89.5
97.7

93.6
90.5
94.1
91.4
98.4

92.5
89.5
92.3
92.3
93.1

88.6
88.7
92.2
88.6
92.7

90.5
89.3
93.1
90.7
94.4

Table 8
Classiﬁcation performance of SFC KNN-HOG vs. byteplot KNN-GIST models.
Method
KNN-HOG
KNN-GIST
KNN-HOG
KNN-GIST

(train)
(train)
(test)
(test)

Prec.

Recall

Acc.

97.6
97.6
97.1
96.9

97.6
97.6
96.6
95.9

97.6
97.5
97.0
96.4

process tracing could be performed, but this would be at the cost
of both time and computation complexity.
The results on the evaluation of the static, dynamic and hybrid
approaches show that the static method was considerably faster
than the dynamic or hybrid methods, yet yielded the poorest classiﬁcation performance. It was observed that the static model returned lowest prediction results for Cryptowall (61%), Chir (58%)
Scar (76%), Emotet (87%) and Agen (87%), which were all obfuscated. The results demonstrate that the static method is not robust
against obfuscation. Classiﬁcation rates were generally higher with
the dynamic method, but the slow processing times of 33s per
sample make this method infeasible to work at large scale. The hybrid approach processes non-obfuscated samples statically and obfuscated samples dynamically, achieving a per-sample average processing time of 12.5s. Since there is no need to endure the processing burden of executing low entropy samples through VMI, the
hybrid framework allows for a considerable decrease in processing
time over the dynamic approach alone. For obfuscated samples, the
hybrid approach solves the limitation of the static method, increasing classiﬁcation model performance by approximately 15%. The
hybrid framework has shown to be the best solution by combining the strengths of static and dynamic approaches.
In a comparative analysis on the VirusTotal dataset, our SFC
KNN-HOG model performed comparably well against the byteplot
KNN-GIST model in terms of classiﬁcation performance and processing time complexity. The results demonstrate our method provides an accurate representation of malware binaries in image format that is comparable to current approaches.

the byteplot representation to the classiﬁcation of malware. Furthermore, several research efforts have based and compared their
work with that of Nataraj et al. (Fu et al., 2018; Le et al., 2018; Luo
and Lo, 2017; Ronen et al., 2018).
The byteplot and SFC conversion processes differ greatly in their
representation of the binary ﬁle. The byteplot uses a byte-to-pixel
mapping, where each byte value (0–255) is mapped to the equivalent grayscale intensity value (0–255). SFC images are mapped
to images through a traversal curve, where data type rather than
byte value, determines the mapping. As described previously in
Section 3.2, the scurve library uses a colour-coding scheme that
classiﬁes bytes (0–255 range) into black for 0 × 00 (0), blue for
ASCII text (1–126), red for high-value bytes (127–254), and white
for 0×ff (255).
The code for the byteplot KNN-GIST algorithm was obtained
from (Nataraj, 2022), which allowed us to reproduce the original
method. The VirusTotal dataset was ﬁrst converted into byteplot
representation. Next, GIST features were calculated from the images. Finally, the feature set and labels were passed to a K-nearest
neighbor classiﬁer.
Table 8 compares the performance metrics obtained for the
KNN-GIST method against our best-performing KNN-HOG method
from Section 5.4. The byteplot KNN-GIST model returned training
performance scores of 97.6%, 97.6% and 97.5% for precision, recall
and accuracy, which is almost identical to our KNN-HOG model’s
performance. In the testing phase, our KNN-HOG model performed
marginally better, with precision, recall and accuracy scores of
97.1%, 96.6% and 97.0% against 96.9%, 95.9% and 96.4% for KNNGIST. In terms of processing times, the KNN-GIST method produced
an average of 6.3ms per sample, which is marginally faster than
our KNN-HOG method, which averaged 8.1ms for the 256 × 256
SFC dataset.

6. Conclusions and future work
In this article, we presented a novel hybrid framework for malware classiﬁcation, based on computer vision and machine learning, designed to improve the current limitations experienced in
static and dynamic malware variant classiﬁcation methods. The
framework is designed to be less invasive than traditional analysis methods in that there is no reverse engineering required, nor
does it suffer from the obfuscation limitations of static analysis.
The framework incorporates classiﬁcation of discriminant features
extracted from malware binaries in image format, mapped through
space-ﬁlling curves. Previous research has shown that space-ﬁlling
curves provide suﬃcient features to be used for image-based malware classiﬁcation. Through experimental analysis, using an up-todate malware sample dataset, it was demonstrated that the hybrid
framework outperformed the static and dynamic analyses standalone methods. The methods produced by this research could be
used to augment the performance of automated malware analysis
tools by increasing the classiﬁcation rates of variants and thereby
reducing the possibility of ambiguity in malware labelling.
Our current research is focused on implementing image segmentation for classiﬁcation at a more granular level. Segmentation
can be used to partition the images into distinct regions containing groups of pixels with similar textures, in this case regions of
similar binary. Regions of interest in an executable binary could be
extracted in this way, disregarding irrelevant data such as padding

5.7. Discussion of results
By varying the image size produced by the scurve library, it was
observed that as image size increased, so too did classiﬁcation performance. However, for the purposes of scalability, which is a requirement of our framework, we chose the 256 × 256 SFC dataset
as it provided near optimum classiﬁcation performance, while being 3.5 times faster than the 512 × 512 samples. Testing the inﬂuence of process dump time intervals on classiﬁcation performance
proved the optimum time varied across each family. Process injection and legacy issues with the code prove that the dynamic
generation of SFC images has its limitations. Further, more invasive
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(regions of binary zeros) or obfuscated sections, where the entropy
would otherwise adversely affect the classiﬁcation algorithms. Additionally we intend to investigate the eﬃcacy of other SFCs, such
as the H-curve (Niedermeier et al., 2002), applied to the malware
domain. Finally, deep learning models, such as convolutional neural
networks, could be utilised to improve performance. Such models
do not require feature extraction and so would simplify the processing phases.

Le, Q., Boydell, O., Namee, B.M., Scanlon, M., 2018. Deep learning at the shallow
end: malware classiﬁcation for non-domain experts 26, S118–S126. doi:10.1016/
j.diin.2018.04.024.
Luo, J., Lo, D.C., 2017. Binary malware image classiﬁcation using machine learning
with local binary pattern. In: 2017 IEEE International Conference on Big Data
(Big Data), pp. 4664–4667. doi:10.1109/BigData.2017.8258512.
Lyda, R., Hamrock, J., 2007. Using entropy analysis to ﬁnd encrypted and packed
malware. IEEE Security Privacy 5 (2), 40–45. doi:10.1109/MSP.2007.48.
McConnell, R. K., 1986. Method of and apparatus for pattern recognition.
Moon, B., Jagadish, H.V., Faloutsos, C., Saltz, J.H., 2001. Analysis of the clustering
properties of the hilbert space-ﬁlling curve. IEEE Trans Knowl Data Eng 13 (1),
124–141. doi:10.1109/69.908985.
Moore, E.H., 1900. Errata: “on certain crinkly curves” [trans. amer. math. soc. 1
(190 0), no. 1, 72–90; 150 0526]. Trans Am Math Soc 1 (4), 507. doi:10.1090/
s0 0 02- 9947- 1900- 1500428- 3.
Morton, G.M., 1966. A computer oriented geodetic data base; and a new technique
in ﬁle sequencing. Technical Report (IBM).
Nataraj, L., 2022. Supervised classiﬁcation with k-fold cross validation on
a multi family malware dataset. https://sarvamblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/
supervised- classiﬁcation- with- k- fold.html.
Nataraj, L., Karthikeyan, S., Jacob, G., Manjunath, B.S., 2011. Malware images: Visualization and automatic classiﬁcation. In: Proceedings of the 8th International
Symposium on Visualization for Cyber Security. Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA doi:10.1145/2016904.2016908.
Nataraj, L., Yegneswaran, V., Porras, P., Zhang, J., 2011. A comparative assessment
of malware classiﬁcation using binary texture analysis and dynamic analysis.
Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, pp. 21–30. doi:10.
1145/2046684.2046689.
Nguyen, G., Franco, P., Mullot, R., Ogier, J., 2012. Mapping high dimensional features
onto hilbert curve: Applying to fast image retrieval. In: Proceedings of the 21st
International Conference on Pattern Recognition (ICPR2012), pp. 425–428.
Niedermeier, R., Reinhardt, K., Sanders, P., 2002. Towards optimal locality in meshindexings. Discrete Appl. Math. 117 (1–3), 211–237. doi:10.1016/s0166-218x(00)
00326-7.
Nivarti, G. V., Salehi, M. M., Bushe, W. K.,. A mesh partitioning algorithm for preserving spatial locality in arbitrary geometries 281, 352–364. doi:10.1016/j.jcp.
2014.10.022.
Ojala, T., Pietikäinen, M., Mäenpää, T., 20 0 0. Gray scale and rotation invariant texture classiﬁcation with local binary patterns. In: Proceedings of the 6th European Conference on Computer Vision-Part I. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg,
pp. 404–420.
Ojala, T., Pietikäinen, M., Harwood, D., 1996. A comparative study of texture measures with classiﬁcation based on featured distributions. Pattern Recognit 29
(1), 51–59. doi:10.1016/0 031-3203(95)0 0 067-4.
Oliva, A., Torralba, A., 2001. Modeling the shape of the scene: a holistic representation of the spatial envelope. Int J Comput Vis 42 (3). doi:10.1023/A:
1011139631724.
O’Shaughnessy, S., 2019. Image-based malware classiﬁcation: a space ﬁlling curve
approach. 2019 IEEE Symposium on Visualization for Cyber Security (VizSec)
doi:10.1109/vizsec48167.2019.9161583.
ÓShaughnessy, S., 2019. Sfc datasets. https://github.com/stephen-oshaughnessy/
SFC-datasets.
Peano, G., 1890. Sur une courbe, qui remplit toute une aire plane. Mathematische
Annalen 36 (1), 157–160. doi:10.1007/bf01199438.
Ronen, R., Radu, M., Feuerstein, C., Yom-Tov, E., Ahmadi, M., 2018. Microsoft malware
classiﬁcation challenge. arXiv:1802.10135.
Russinovich, M., Richards, A., 2020. Procdump - windows sysinternals. https://docs.
microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump.
S2-Geometry, G., 2017. S2 cells. https://s2geometry.io/devguide/s2cell_hierarchy.
html.
Shannon, C.E., 1948. A mathematical theory of communication. Bell System Technical Journal 27 (3), 379–423. doi:10.1145/584091.584093.
Sklearn, 2020. Sklearn gridsearchcv. https://scikit-learn.org/0.17/modules/generated/
sklearn.grid_search.GridSearchCV.html.
Vasan, D., Alazab, M., Wassan, S., Safaei, B., Zheng, Q., 2020. Image-based malware
classiﬁcation using ensemble of cnn architectures (imcec). Computers & Security
92, 101748. doi:10.1016/j.cose.2020.101748.
Vu, D., Nguyen, T., Nguyen, T.V., Nguyen, T.N., Massacci, F., Phung, P.H., 2019.
Hit4mal: hybrid image transformation for malware classiﬁcation. Transactions
on Emerging Telecommunications Technologies 31 (11). doi:10.1002/ett.3789.
Wagner, M., Fischer, F., Luh, R., Haberson, A., Rind, A., Keim, D.A., Aigner, W.,
2015. A survey of visualization systems for malware analysis. In: Borgo, R.
(Ed.), Eurographics Conference on Visualization (EuroVis) ; STARs - State of The
Art Reports. The Eurographics Association, pp. 105–125. doi:10.2312/eurovisstar.
20151114.
Wattenberg, M., 2005. A note on space-ﬁlling visualizations and space-ﬁlling curves.
In: IEEE Symposium on Information Visualization, 20 05. INFOVIS 20 05, pp. 181–
186. doi:10.1109/INFVIS.2005.1532145.
Yajamanam, S., Selvin, V., Di Troia, F., Stamp, M., 2018. Deep learning versus gist
descriptors for image-based malware classiﬁcation. In: Proceedings of the 4th
International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy (2018),
pp. 553–561. doi:10.5220/0 0 06685805530561.
Yajamanam, S., Selvin, V.R.S., Di Troia, F., Stamp, M., 2018. Deep learning versus gist
descriptors for image-based malware classiﬁcation. In: Proceedings of the 4th
International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy vol. 1,
ForSE, pp. 553–561. INSTICC. SciTePress. doi: 10.5220/0 0 06685805530561.

Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing ﬁnancial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to
inﬂuence the work reported in this paper.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Stephen O’Shaughnessy: Conceptualization, Methodology, Software, Validation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Resources, Data curation, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing, Visualization, Project administration. Stephen Sheridan: Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing, Supervision, Project administration.
References
Anderson, B., Storlie, C., Lane, T., 2012. Improving malware classiﬁcation: Bridging
the static/dynamic gap. Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY,
USA, pp. 3–14. doi:10.1145/2381896.2381900.
AV-Test, 2020. Malware statistics & trends report. https://www.av-test.org/en/
statistics/malware/.
Baptista, I., 2018. Binary visualisation for malware detection. The Plymouth Student
Scientist 11, 223–237.
Conti, G., Bratus, S., Shubina, A., Lichtenberg, A., Sangster, B., Supan, M., 2010. A
visual study of primitive binary fragment types.
Conti, G., Bratus, S., Shubina, A., Sangster, B., Ragsdale, R., Supan, M., Lichtenberg, A.,
Perez-Alemany, R.,. Automated mapping of large binary objects using primitive
fragment type classiﬁcation 7, S3–S12. doi:10.1016/j.diin.2010.05.002.
Conti, G., Dean, E., Sinda, M., Sangster, B., 2008. Visual reverse engineering of binary and data ﬁles. In: Goodall, J.R., Conti, G., Ma, K.-L. (Eds.), Visualization for
Computer Security. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 1–17.
Cortesi, A., 2012. scurve, a space-ﬁlling curve library. https://github.com/cortesi/
scurve.
Demir, H., 2018. Classiﬁcation of texture images based on the histogram of oriented
gradients using support vector machines. Istanbul University - Journal of Electrical and Electronics Engineering 18, 90–94.
Fu, J., Xue, J., Wang, Y., Liu, Z., Shan, C., 2018. Malware visualization for ﬁne-grained
classiﬁcation. IEEE Access 6, 14510–14523. doi:10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2805301.
Fukushima, Y., Sakai, A., Hori, Y., Sakurai, K., 2010. A behavior based malware detection scheme for avoiding false positive. In: 2010 6th IEEE Workshop on Secure
Network Protocols, pp. 79–84. doi:10.1109/NPSEC.2010.5634444.
Gabor, D., 1946. Theory of communication. Journal of Institution of Electrical Engineers 93 (3), 429–457. doi:10.1049/ji- 3- 2.1946.0074.
Garﬁnkel, T., Rosenblum, M., 2003. A virtual machine introspection based architecture for intrusion detection. In: In Proc. Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium, pp. 191–206.
Gray, F., 1953. Pulse code communication.
Harb, H.M., Desuky, A.S., Mohammed, A., Jennane, R., 2017. Histogram of oriented
gradients and texture features for bone texture characterization. Int J Comput
Appl 165 (3), 23–28. doi:10.5120/ijca2017913820.
Hilbert, D., 1891. Über die stetige abbildung einer linie auf ein ﬂächenstück. Mathematische Annalen Zeitschriftenband (1891) 459—-460.
Huang, Y.-K., 2013. Indexing and querying moving objects with uncertain speed and
direction in spatiotemporal databases. doi:10.1007/s10109- 013- 0191- 6.
Johnson, B., Shneiderman, B., 1991. Tree-maps: a space-ﬁlling approach to the visualization of hierarchical information structures. In: Proceeding Visualization ’91,
pp. 284–291. doi:10.1109/VISUAL.1991.175815.
Kaspersky, 2020. The number of new malicious ﬁles detected every day increases
by 5.2% to 360,0 0 0 in 2020. Kaspersky.com. https://www.kaspersky.com/
about/press-releases/2020_the-number-of-new-malicious-ﬁles-detected-everyday-increases-by-52-to-360 0 0 0-in-2020.
Khalilian, A., Nourazar, A., Vahidi-Asl, M., Haghighi, H., 2018. G3md: Mining frequent
opcode sub-graphs for metamorphic malware detection of existing families. Expert Syst Appl 112, 15–33. doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2018.06.012.
Kolter, J.Z., Maloof, M.A., 2004. Learning to detect malicious executables in the wild.
Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, pp. 470–478. doi:10.
1145/1014052.1014105.
13

S. O’Shaughnessy and S. Sheridan

Computers & Security 116 (2022) 102660

S. O’Shaughnessy is a lecturer in Cyber Security at the
Technological University Dublin, Ireland, where he delivers modules in Secure Coding, Application Security and
Malware Forensics. He is also programme coordinator for
the BSc. (Hons.) in Digital Forensics and Computer Security degree programme. His research interests lie in Cyber
Security, with a particular focus on applications of machine learning to malware detection and classiﬁcation.

Stephen Sheridan is a full-time Lecturer in Computing
Science at Technological University Dublin (TU Dublin)
and is a member of the Security Research group on the
Blanchardstown campus. Stephen has been involved in
the design and delivery of a wide range of Computer Science programmes at TU Dublin and supervises student
projects in Computer Science and Cyber Security at undergraduate and postgraduate levels. His current research
interests are in the area of data exﬁltration and in particular the use of DNS as a covert channel. The recent focus
of Stephen’s research work in data Exﬁltration over DNS
has been in the application of machine learning techniques to detect temporal patterns in DNS traﬃc that are
often a sign of command-and-control activity and the analysis of DNS query strings
using statistical techniques in order to identify useful features that can help detect
data exﬁltration.

14

